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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 11-2288 
___________ 
 
LENELLE GRAY, 
Appellant 
 
v. 
 
B.A. BLEDSOE 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 10-2194) 
District Judge:  Honorable Yvette Kane 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Summary Action 
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
July 21, 2011 
 
Before:  FISHER, BARRY and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: July 29, 2011) 
_________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Lenelle Gray, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals from the district 
court’s order dismissing his petition filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.  Because his 
appeal presents no substantial question, we will summarily affirm the district court’s 
order.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. 
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I. 
 In 2005, Gray pled guilty to two counts of possession with intent to distribute 
cocaine, and one count of using a firearm in a drug trafficking offense, violating 18 
U.S.C. § 924(c), in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, 
Eastern Division.  (N.D. Oh. 05-cr-00143.)  It appears that he voluntarily dismissed his 
direct appeal in October 2006.  In July 2009, Gray filed a motion to vacate his sentence 
under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in the Northern District of Ohio.  The motion was dismissed as 
untimely, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied Gray’s 
request for a certificate of appealability on April 1, 2010. 
 Gray is currently confined in the United States Penitentiary at Lewisburg, 
Pennsylvania.  On October 25, 2010 he filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 
28 U.S.C. § 2241 in the United States District Court for the Middle District of 
Pennsylvania.  He argues that pursuant to United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), he 
was wrongfully convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) because he merely possessed 
the firearm at issue.1
                                                 
1 Lopez invalidated the Gun-Free Schools Zones Act, determining that it was 
unconstitutional because it “neither regulate[d] a commercial activity nor contain[ed] a 
requirement that the possession [of a firearm] be connected in any way to interstate 
commerce.”  514 U.S. at 551.  Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that the Act 
exceeded the authority of Congress “to regulate Commerce . . . among the several states.”  
Id. 
  He asserts he committed a state, rather than federal, offense 
We note that conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) requires the government to 
show:  (1) the immediate availability and physical transportation of a firearm by the 
defendant (2) in relation to a drug trafficking offense.  
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because possession of a firearm does not affect interstate commerce and that he is thus 
actually innocent under Lopez. 
 The district court thereafter provided Gray with a notice pursuant to United States 
v. Miller, 197 F.3d 644 (3d Cir. 1999).  Because Gray failed to respond to the Miller 
notice, the district court considered the petition under Section 2241.  And on May 4, 
2011, the district court adopted the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation and dismissed 
Gray’s petition for lack of jurisdiction, determining that Section 2241 was not the proper 
vehicle for bringing his claim. 
 Gray now appeals. 
II. 
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  “We exercise plenary review 
over the district court’s legal conclusions and apply a clearly erroneous standard to its 
factual findings.”  Cradle v. U.S. ex rel. Miner, 290 F.3d 536, 538 (3d Cir. 2002).  
 As the district court determined, Gray’s claim is not viable under Section 2241.  A 
federal prisoner can challenge his conviction or sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 if the 
remedy provided by 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is “inadequate or ineffective” to test the legality of 
his or her detention.  Cradle, 290 F.3d at 538; Okereke v. United States, 307 F.3d 117, 
120 (3d Cir. 2002).  This occurs “only where the petitioner demonstrates that some 
limitation of scope or procedure would prevent” the petitioner from receiving adequate 
adjudication of his or her claims under § 2255.  Cradle, 290 F.3d at 538.  This exception 
is extremely narrow and applies only in rare circumstances.  See, e.g., In re Dorsainvil, 
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119 F.3d 245, 251-52 (3d Cir. 1997) (applying exception where an intervening change in 
the law decriminalized the conduct underlying the petitioner’s conviction and he had no 
other opportunity to pursue his claim). 
 Gray asserts that he is actually innocent of violating 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) because 
the conduct for which he was arrested was a state crime and the firearm did not implicate 
the Commerce Clause.  Thus, he appears to argue that under Lopez, he was wrongfully 
convicted.  Without regard to the substantive merit of his claim, Gray does not meet the 
requirements for proceeding under § 2241.  As noted above, Dorsainvil allows relief 
under Section 2241 when a subsequent change in law renders a petitioner’s conduct no 
longer criminal.  See Okereke, 307 F.3d at 120-21.  However, as the district court 
explained, Gray was convicted ten years after Lopez was decided.  Accordingly, there 
was no intervening change in the law that decriminalized the conduct for which Gray was 
convicted. 
 Finally, Gray has not demonstrated that § 2255 is an “inadequate or ineffective” 
method by which to make his challenge.  See Cradle, 290 F.3d at 538.  The Northern 
District of Ohio dismissed Gray’s first § 2255 motion as untimely, making it likely that 
Gray would encounter hurdles in filing a second § 2255 motion.  However, we have 
repeatedly held that a prisoner’s inability to meet § 2255’s stringent gatekeeping 
requirements does not render it inadequate or ineffective.  Id. at 538-39 (“It is the 
inefficacy of the remedy, not the personal inability to use it, that is determinative.”). 
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 For these reasons, we conclude that this appeal presents “no substantial question,” 
and will therefore summarily affirm the district court’s judgment.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 
27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. 
